The Donation-Redemption Of Closely
Held Stock As A Constructive Dividend To
The Donor by unknown
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 1 Article 6
Spring 3-1-1974
The Donation-Redemption Of Closely Held Stock
As A Constructive Dividend To The Donor
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Securities Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University School of Law
Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
The Donation-Redemption Of Closely Held Stock As A Constructive Dividend To The Donor, 31 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 129 (1974), https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol31/iss1/6
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
THE DONATION-REDEMPTION OF CLOSELY
HELD STOCK AS A CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDEND TO
THE DONOR
When the controlling shareholder of a close corporation donates a
portion of his appreciated' stock to a tax-exempt organization, 2 he is
generally allowed a deduction from his gross income equivalent to the
fair market value3 of the donated stock.' Even though the donor is
allowed this deduction, he does not realize' the appreciation in value
of the donated property as taxable income, despite the fact that this
appreciation may represent income earned by his corporation.6 This
'The appreciation in value of corporate stock is normally the result of increments
in its fair market value. Because there is no public market place where closely held
corporate stock is traded, its fair market value must be assessed by reference to factors
other than a "traded" price. Experts usually determine this fair market value by
examining the prospects for future yield on the stock as governed substantially by the
earnings record of the corporation. See 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION OF PROPERTY 25,
1020-21 (1st ed. 1937). This value is usually referred to as the "investment" value of
the stock. Id.
2See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c) and (d) for a list of the organizations that
are "exempt" from the federal income tax.
3For income tax purposes, the fair market value of close corporation stock is
usually determined by reference to its "investment" value. 1 J. BONBRIGHT, VALUATION
OF PROPERTY 1020-21 (1st ed. 1937). For a definition of "investment" value, see note 1
supra.
'See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(a)(1) where the Code states:
(a) ALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION-
(1) GENERAL RuLE.-There shall be allowed as a deduction any chari-
table contribution . . . payment of which is made within the taxable
year. A charitable contribution shall be allowable as a deduction only
if verified under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his dele-
gate.
At Treas. Reg. § 1.170-1(c) the Secretary has stated the general rule that the allowable
deduction for donations of property is determined by the fair market value of the
property at the time of the contribution. There are many exceptions to this general
rule, but the fair market value determination is the underlying concept from which
the exceptions derive. For a general study of the latest changes instituted by Congress
in the area of charitable deductions see Myers, New Limitations on Charitable Contri-
butions Other Than Charitable Trusts, N.Y.U. 29TH INST. ON FED. TAx. 2061 (1970).
5Generally, gains are not realized until their existence has been reasonably estab-
lished through the occurrence of a taxable event, as described in the Internal Revenue
Code at §§ 61 and 1001. Because Congress nowhere provides that the charitable dona-
tion of appreciated property is a taxable event and the Internal Revenue Code at
§ 1002 clearly limits taxation to gains realized through such a taxable event, non-
realization treatment is granted to the donor. See note 7 infra.
'Even though the assets of a corporation may have been increased by earnings and
profits, the Supreme Court has held that in general no shareholder has a separate and
divisible, taxable interest in those assets merely because of the ownership rights em-
1974]
130" WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
non-realization treatment is afforded the donor because Congress has
consistently determined that a charitable contribution should not be
deemed a taxable event.7 Generally, taxable events occur with respect
to stock only when a shareholder either sells his shares8 or receives a
distribution of corporate earnings through a dividend9 or stock re-
demption. '
This favorable tax treatment for charitable contributions of corpo-
rate stock, when combined with a redemption of the donated stock,
is particularly advantageous for a controlling shareholder who wishes
to transfer money from his corporation into the hands of a designated
tax-exempt institution. By irrevocably donating a portion of his stock
to the institution, the shareholder fully enjoys the fair market value
deduction incident to charitable gifts of appreciated property." A
subsequent redemption of the donated stock provides both the donor
and the donee with benefits which are not normally associated with
an irrevocable transfer of closely held corporate stock. Among these
benefits are the possible return of the donor to his pre-donation,
proportionate interest in his corporation,'" and the conversion into
cash of the typically unmarketable' 3 capital asset held by the donee.
bodied in the stock he holds. See Estate of Putnam v. Commissioner, 324 U.S. 393,
399-400 (1945). There are statutory exceptions to the general proposition of Putnam
requiring the shareholder to report his proportionate share of the corporate income
even though retained by the corporation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 551 (foreign per-
sonal holding companies), § 951 ("controlled" foreign corporations), and § 1373
(earned yet undistributed income of a Subchapter S corporation taxed to sharehold-
ers).
Since the Internal Revenue Code has long required that the donee assume the
donor's basis in the donated property, Congress by implication has allowed the non-
realization of income by a donor of appreciated property. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1015.
'See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1001, 1002.
!For the purposes of its taxation to a shareholder as a distribution of earnings
under § 301, dividend is defined by the Internal Revenue Code in § 316. A dividend
may take many forms but is generally thought of as cash or property.
'See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 302 for the tax effect of stock redemptions on a
shareholder, and in particular see United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970), where
the Supreme Court held that a redemption of stock from a controlling shareholder in
a close corporation will generally be the equivalent of a dividend for tax purposes.
"See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
'2A redemption of donated stock will return the shareholder to his predonation,
proportionate interest in his corporation only when he or related parties own all of the
outstanding stock prior to the donation. Absent total ownership, control over the
redemption mechanism would appear to be most important to the donor of voting stock
because it provides a means to transfer cash to a charitable organization without any
permanent transfer of voting control.
'"The stock received by the donee is unmarketable with respect to its public sale
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In addition, when the donor effects the redemption, he achieves a tax-
free withdrawal of corporate earnings and profits4 by transferring
them to a tax-exempt institution of his choice.
The Internal Revenue Service has consistently resisted the advan-
tageous tax treatment afforded these donation-redemption transac-
tions, asking the courts, through one application of the step transac-
tion doctrine,' 5 to disregard "form"' 6 and tax the substantive reality
17
of the events which occur. Specifically, the IRS has asked the courts
to "reorder" these donation-redemption schemes as redemptions of
stock from the donor followed by his charitable donation of the re-
demption proceeds. 8 By such a reconstruction of events, the donor is
deemed to have constructively received dividend income in the
amount of the redemption proceeds and is taxed accordingly. 9 In
Behrend v. United States20 the IRS contended that where the two
controlling shareholders fully intended to cause redemption of the
stock donated by them to a private foundation, they should not have
received the benefit of charitable deductions without being held in
because closely held stock is typically untraded and cannot be sold to the public absent
S.E.C. registration. Since such registration would be costly, time consuming, and
normally discretionary with the donor's corporation, the donee must depend on the
redemption procedure for funds.
"The effect of the redemption upon the earnings and profits of the corporation
would appear to be controlled by § 312 (a) and (e) of the Internal Revenue Code even
though the shareholder here is a tax-exempt organization. Because the redemption has
terminated the entire interest of this stockholder in the corporation, it would appear
that the redemption falls within the purview of § 302(b)(3) and is not a § 301(c)
dividend. The redemption is, therefore, a § 302(a) distribution in exchange for stock,
and reduces the earnings and profits of the corporation by the amount of the distribu-
tion which is not "properly chargeable to capital account." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 312(a) and (e). The courts and the Internal Revenue Service itself have been unable
to agree on precisely what method should be utilized to determine what portion of a
distribution is "properly chargeable to capital account." For an analysis of the diverse
methods which have been used, see B. BITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION
OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 1 9.65 (3d ed. 1971).
"7The courts have enunciated a number of different ways in which step transaction
analysis can manifest itself. Regardless of whether the court is asked to "reorder" a
number of transactions, combine several transactions into one, or disregard the legal
significance of one event in a series, the basic problem facing the court is the determi-
nation of the substantive reality of the facts presented. King Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 n.6 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
"I~d.
'1Id.
"Cf. Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 716 (1961), discussed at text accompany-
ing notes 65-69 infra.
"See note 10 supra.
"73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,065 (4th Cir. 1972).
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constructive receipt of the redemption proceeds. However, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this contention and refused to
"reorder" the donation-redemption transaction because there was no
evidence of a "binding obligation"2 ' to redeem the donated stock after
its irrevocable transfer to the private foundation.
In Behrend the plaintiffs, brothers Alvin and Maxwell Behrend,
were the only shareholders in their closely held corporation." In 1952,
through a tax-free reorganization, the corporation authorized and
issued to its shareholders Class "A" and Class "B" preferred stock,2
the latter of which the Behrends intended to donate to a tax-exempt
foundation2 to be organized in 1954. During the period from 1955
until 1962, the foundation funded itself through loans from the corpo-
ration and bank loans executed on the basis of personal endorsements
by the plaintiffs.25 However, it was the ultimate intention of the Beh-
rends to cause the redemption of the donated stock,2 thereby both
funding the foundation on a debt-free basis and extinguishing their
personal liability on the bank loans.
Subsequently, in 1962 and 1964, the preferred stock, which had
been donated to the foundation over a period of five years, 27 was
redeemed and the proceeds were used to satisfy the indebtedness to
both the banks and the corporation. The Internal Revenue Service
determined that for both these years, the two brothers, because they
"'Id. at 80,067.
2 Some of the stock issued at the time of the 1952 reorganization was issued to
Maxwell's wife, Nettie. However, for all practical purposes the only shareholders were
the two brothers, since Nettie's stock in most instances would be attributed to her
husband for tax purposes. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 318(a)(1)(A)(i).
2'It is clear that had the reorganization taken place after 1954 the preferred stock
received by the Behrends would have been § 306 stock, since both held common stock
in the same proportion as before the reorganization. Section 1.306-3(a) of the Treasury
Regulations provides:
Any class of stock distributed to a shareholder in a transaction in
which no amount is includible in the income of the shareholder or no
gain or loss is recognized may be § 306 stock, provided the distribut-
ing corporation has earnings and profits at the time of the distribu-
tion.
See Rev. Rul. 332, 1966-2 CuNi. BULL. 108; Rev. Rul. 84, 1959-1 CuN'. BULL. 71. For a
discussion of the special tax treatment afforded donations of § 306 stock since the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, see note 78 infra.
21The foundation was founded and fully owned by the Behrend family. See 73-1
U.S. Tax Cas. at 80,065.
2-Brief for Appellant at 5, Brief for Appellee at 5, Behrend v. United States, 73-1
U.S. Tax Cas. 80,065 (4th Cir. 1972).
2-The preferred stock was donated in the following manner:
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had donated the stock to the foundation fully intending its cash con-
version, should be held individually taxable on their proportionate
share of the redemption proceeds. The Behrends disagreed with the
Service's determination, but paid the taxes assessed and brought
individual suits for refund in the district court.28 The Fourth Circuit
upheld the district court's allowance of refund, finding that the Beh-
rends had made a valid and irrevocable gift of appreciated property
and thereby could not be taxed on the corporate earnings distributed
through the redemption.
The primary authority for the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Behrend
was a 1964 Tax Court decision, Humacid Co. v. Commissioner." In
Humacid the court found that the payment by the taxpayer's corpo-
ration of promissory notes three weeks after their charitable donation
by him did not constitute a constructive receipt of income by the
donor.3 In contrast, the court did find the taxpayer in constructive
receipt of income when other notes, which his corporation had bound
itself to retire before maturity, were paid off one month after their
sale by the taxpayer. Despite the fact that the donor controlled the
corporation,3 the Tax Court felt that the donation-payment events
did not bear the slightest resemblance to the sham sale transaction
the taxpayer had utilized to avoid the receipt of ordinary income.
Total Donors
Shares
Year Donated Alvin Maxwell Nettie (Maxwell's wife)
1954 150 75 75
1955 150 75 75
1956 150 75 75
1957 65 65
1959 120 60 60
Brief for Appellant at 4, Brief for Appellee at 4, Behrend v. United States, 73-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. 80,065 (4th Cir. 1972).
'8The deficiency assessed by the Internal Revenue Service against each share-
holder was paid and the Behrends then entered separate suits for refund in the district
court. The two actions were then consolidated for decision by the district court which
rendered an unreported opinion for the taxpayers. See Brief for Appellant at 2 n.3,
Behrend v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,065 (4th Cir. 1972).
"42 T.C. 894 (1964).
"Because payment of the notes by the corporation apparently would not have
qualified their holder for capital gains treatment pursuant to § 1232(a)(1) of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, retirement of the notes would have resulted in the receipt of ordi-
nary income by their holder. 42 T.C. at 902-03.
"'The court felt that the control factor may indeed have been relevant if other
circumstances, such as evidence that money had been "set aside" to redeem the notes,
had been present. 42 T.C. at 913. See note 58 infra and accompanying text.
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Rather, the court felt the donation resembled a gift of appreciated
property to which the following applied:
A gift of appreciated property does not result in income to the
donor so long as he gives the property away absolutely and
parts with title thereto before the property gives rise to income
by way of a sale.
2
Apparently, the vital distinction between the sham sale and the char-
itable donation was the fact that the corporation was not legally
obligated to retire the donated notes before maturity.
The Fourth Circuit, in accordance with the rationale of the
Humacid court, searched for evidence of a "binding obligation" on
the part of either the corporation to redeem the donated stock, or the
foundation to demand its redemption. Relying heavily on Humacid 
3
and a long line of cases" clearly enunciating the tax consequences to
a donor of appreciated property, the court refused, absent evidence
of a "binding obligation," to "reorder" the donation-redemption
transaction and thereby deny legal donative significance to the initial
transfer of stock to the foundation . 3 As a result, the taxpayers in
Behrend were held entitled "to adopt any lawful method which could
save taxes, while attaining their wish to fund their charity. ' 37
Since Behrend, decisions favorable to the taxpayer in both the
Fifth and Second Circuits have primarily relied on the "no binding
obligation" language of the Fourth Circuit. In Carrington v.
Commissioner"' the Fifth Circuit was asked to examine the tax status
142 T.C. at 913.
173-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 80,067. Though the Humacid court had spoken of legal
obligation, it seems clear from the rationale of the Fourth Circuit that the "binding
obligation" language it adopted was synonymous with the legal obligation terminology.
3 Id. The Fourth Circuit quoted Humacid as fully dispositive of the issue of gifts
of appreciated stock by a controlling shareholder.
"The Fourth Circuit also cited the following cases as supporting its position that
the Humacid principles with respect to gifts of appreciated property should govern:
Jacobs v. United States, 280 F. Supp. 437 (S.D. Ohio 1966), aff'd mem., 390 F.2d 877
(6th Cir. 1968) (no constructive receipt where taxpayer donated stock to private foun-
dation prior to a complete liquidation); Martin v. Machiz, 251 F. Supp. 381 (D. Md.
1966) (valid gift occurred when taxpayer created trust for his stock prior to and apart
from a later sale of stock to third party); Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972 (Ct.
Cl. 1966) (no constructive receipt where the taxpayer donated percentage interest in
race horse and later had his corporation purchase the interest). In all three cases the
court rejected application of the step transaction doctrine, holding that the subsequent
events were separate from the original gift.
"73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 80,067.
371d.
'476 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1973).
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of a taxpayer who had donated fifty-one percent of the stock39 in his
close corporation to a church and immediately thereafter caused the
redemption of that stock. The donor, who had been the sole share-
holder in the corporation prior to the gift, was allowed a full charita-
ble deduction without any liability for constructive receipt of income
upon the stock's redemption. 9 The court drew upon Behrend's
suggestion that, in the absence of a legal obligation requiring the
corporation to redeem the stock, the donation should be recognized
as a complete and irrevocable gift. Thus, the "central inquiry" for the
court became whether or not the donor had departed with "all domin-
ion and control over the" donated property." 4' As the taxpayer had
irrevocably transferrrd a fifty-one percent interest in the corporation,
and there was "neither evidence of, nor suggestion that, there was a
prior obligation"4 to redeem the stock, the Fifth Circuit found no
basis for application of the step transaction doctrine.
Most recently, the Second Circuit utilized the "binding obliga-
tion" language of Behrend in Grove v. Commissioner.3 The court
considered the taxability of a donor who for thirteen successive years
transferred common stock in his close corporation to a tax-exempt
educational institution. Each annual block of common stock received
by the donee was redeemed within approximately two years by the
donor's corporation.4 Pursuant to agreement between the donor and
-For the purpose of later distinctions that will be drawn between Carrington and
Behrend it is vital to note here that in Carrington the donor transferred voting stock
and thus divested himself of control over his close corporation. For a full discussion of
these distinctions see note 70 infra.
"1476 F.2d at 709.
"Id. at 708.
2Id. at 709 (emphasis in original).
"ICCH 1973 STAND. FED. TAX REP., U.S. TAX CAS. (73-2, at 81,908) 9591 (2d Cir.
1973).
"The donations and redemptions in Grove were made as follows:
Date of Number of Date of Amount Paid
Donation Shares Redemption to R.P.I.
12/30/54 200 12/29/55 $23,000
12/21/55 220 12/28/56 25,300
12/26/56 220 12/23/57 26,840
12/11/57 205 12/27/58 26,035
12/29/58 195 11/6/59 24,570
12/28/59 200 12/27/60 23,500
11/15/60 210 3/7/62 26,250
10/31/61 200 1/4/63 29,000
11/30/62 172 4/24/64 25,800
12/18/64 165 - -
8/23/65 165 - -
12/6/67 250 - -
12/4/68 250 - -
19741
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the institution, all redemption proceeds were invested and managed
by an established professional firm chosen by the donor. Signifi-
cantly, the donor retained a life interest in the income generated by
the donated securities."
The Second Circuit relied heavily on Behrend and Carrington in
considering whether to hold the donor in constructive receipt of the
redemption proceeds, and adopted the Humacid position with re-
spect to gifts of appreciated property as the "guidepost for [its]
analysis." 6 Consequently, the court found that the donor did not
constructively receive the redemption proceeds because the gifts were
irrevocable and there was no obligation on the part of the donee to
offer the shares, or of the corporation to redeem any of the shares
transferred.47
In further support of its conclusion that the taxpayer made a valid
gift of appreciated property, the Second Circuit turned to the Court
of Claims decision of Sheppard v. United States." In Sheppard the
court had considered the absence of any evidence establishing obliga-
tion or compulsion as crucial in its refusal to hold a taxpayer in
constructive receipt of income when, within days after he donated a
percentage interest in a famous race horse to two tax-exempt entities,
his close corporation purchased the interest from the organizations.
Agreeing completely with the rationale of the court in Sheppard, the
Second Circuit refused without "supporting facts"4 to deny the tax
effect of the irrevocable gifts and "reorder" the events as "two com-
pletely fictional transactions."'"'
In substance, the courts in Behrend, Carrington, and Grove de-
Id. at 81,910-11 n.6.
"'The dividend and interest payments generated by the reinvestment of the re-
demption proceeds were distributed to the donor and reported by him on his personal
income tax return. 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,911.
"Id. at 81,912. See text accompanying notes 29-32 supra.
"73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,912.
'361 F.2d 972 (Ct. Cl. 1966). In particular the Second Circuit focused on the
following statement in Sheppard:
Useful as the step transaction doctrine may be in the interpretation
of equivocal contracts and ambiguous events, it cannot generate
events which never took place just so an additional tax liability might
be asserted.
Id. at 978. It appears that the Second Circuit placed particular reliance on Sheppard
because this language was directed specifically at an IRS assertion that a series of
transactions must be "reordered" for tax purposes. See also Behrend v. United States,
73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,065, 80,067, where the Fourth Circuit cited Sheppard as approv-
ing the principles of Humacid.
1173-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,913.
51-id
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cided that the non-existence of a "binding obligation" on the part of
the parties involved to redeem the stock was determinative of the
question of whether to "reorder" the donation-redemption transac-
tions and thereby tax the donor for constructive receipt of income.
Any conclusions regarding the adequacy of this analysis, as enunci-
ated in Behrend and relied upon in Carrington and Grove, must
depend upon its relationship to those inquiries traditionally made by
courts when considering application of the step transaction doctrine.
Examination of the reported cases and the diverse business transac-
tions they encompass reveals that there is no universal test applicable
to step transaction situations. 5' Rather, what emerges is a series of
interrelated inquiries that are faithful to the central purpose of the
doctrine itself even when they are made on a purely ad hoc basis, i.e.,
to assure that tax consequences turn on the substantive reality of the
transactions which occur.
52
In attempting to discover the substantive reality of a series of
events, courts have never denied to the taxpayer the independent
legal significance of a group of "fortuitous ' 53 transactions. The exist-
ence of a "binding obligation" on the parties involved, however, has
traditionally converted fortuity into certainty and provided courts a
sound legal basis upon which to reconstruct a series of transactions,54
regardless of whether tax liability is thereby increased or decreased. 5
The Fourth Circuit in Behrend was, therefore, firmly founded in tra-
ditional step transaction analysis when it searched for a "binding
obligation" to redeem the donated stock.
The court departed from tradition, however, when it concluded
that failure to find evidence of a "binding obligation" to redeem the
stock necessitated complete rejection of the step transaction doc-
trine.r, Apparently relying on Humacid and Sheppard, the court de-
5'King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511, 516 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
21Id. at 516-17.
51The Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83, 97 (1968), used the
term "fortuity" to describe an event that occurs by mere circumstance and held that
events which occur by chance must be considered independent of one another for tax
purposes.
"'Starr v. Commissioner, 82 F.2d 964, 967 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 680
(1936) (three steps in corporate reorganization were held to constitute one general
transaction where the various steps by contract were interdependent); Rev. Rul. 370,
1950-2 CuM BULL. 203 (transferor is taxable on income realized upon sale of appreciated
securities transferred to educational institution as trustee where trust agreement re-
quired the sale).
5Kanawha Gas and Util. Co. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 685, 691 (5th Cir. 1954);
accord, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1959).
"This limited analysis by the Fourth Circuit contrasts with numerous decisions
1974]
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cided that a lack of obligation or compulsion abrogated the necessity
for further inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the donation-
redemption transaction. Neither Humacid, Sheppard, nor any of the
cases 57 in the constructive receipt area of tax litigation fully support
the limited analysis adopted by the Fourth Circuit in Behrend.
In Humacid, for example, the Tax Court utilized the existence of
a contractual obligation to substantiate reconstructing the transac-
tions in the case of the sham sale, but refused to do so in the case of
the charitable donation where no legal obligation existed. However,
the court's refusal to "reorder" the donation-payment events was not
based solely on the absence of a contractual obligation to repay the
notes. Since the donor controlled the corporation, the court appar-
ently felt that, if other evidence had been present indicating that the
donor had decided to pay off the notes prior to the donation, that
evidence could have been sufficient to support a reconstruction of the
donation-redemption transaction, even in the absence of a legal obli-
gation. The court concluded:
Since respondent has failed to prove that petitioner ever set
aside any funds with which to redeem the notes donated by
[taxpayer] to the exempt organizations prior to such transfer,
[taxpayer] cannot be found to have been in constructive re-
ceipt. .... 7,
by the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts which have consistently applied
the step transaction doctrine although evidence of a "binding obligation" was lacking.
See, e.g., Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v. Helver-
ing, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); King Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 511 (Ct.
Cl. 1969); Malkan v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1305 (1970); Phelon v. Commissioner, 25
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1024 (1966); Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 716 (1961).
17See Humacid Co. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 894, 913 (1964), and the cases cited
therein. None of these cases rely solely on the absence of a "binding obligation" for
their denial of step transaction analysis. Particular note should be taken of Fox v.
Commissioner, 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1001 (1968), which was cited in Grove. After
two brothers formed a close corporation, one decided to sell his interest to the other.
Accordingly, through a tax-free reorganization the corporation reissued common stock
in the same proportion as before the recapitalization and issued a new series of pre-
ferred stock. Taxpayer, the selling brother, sold his common stock to the corporation
and donated the preferred to a tax-exempt organization. The court's refusal to hold
the taxpayer in constructive receipt upon the donated stock's redemption was based
on the donor's inability to control the corporation after the donation as well as on the
absence of any legal obligation on the parties. 27 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 1013.
'Humacid Co. v. Commissioner, 42 T.C. 894, 913 (1964). Clearly, the "setting
aside" of funds in itself would not have created a legal obligation on the part of the
corporation to pay the notes before maturity. However, such a procedure would estab-
lish that the donor, as agent for the corporation, had intended to pay the note prior to
its donation to the charity. Thus, contrary to what the Fourth Circuit stated in
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A careful reading of Sheppard also indicates that the Court of
Claims never intended that obligation or compulsion should become
the sole determinant for implementation of step transaction analysis.
The court clearly held that because the donor parted with control
over the property donated, there could be no constructive receipt.
That finding was based not solely on the absence of contractual obli-
gation, but also on the totality of circumstances surrounding the
donation." It would seem, then, that the failure of the Fourth Circuit
in Behrend, and the Fifth and Second Circuits in reliance thereon,
to consider elements other than the mere absence of a "binding obli-
gation" to redeem was a serious shortcoming in their analyses. Both
Humacid and Sheppard, although heavily relied upon in support of
this limited analysis, appear to stand for a contrary proposition: that
only examination of the totality of circumstances can suffice when a
court is asked to determine the substantive reality of a series of taxa-
ble events.
The refusal of the respective courts in Behrend, Carrington, and
Grove to proceed beyond their "binding obligation" line of analysis
left unanswered two inquiries traditionally considered before refusing
to "reorder" transactions through imposition of the step transaction
doctrine. First, did donor control of the corporation and thus its re-
demption mechanism abrogate the necessity for a "binding obliga-
tion" to redeem the stock, where the evidence indicated that the
donor had adopted, prior to the stock's transfer, a plan to convert the
donated stock into money? Second, what role should the derivation
of economic benefit by the donor play in determining the application
of the constructive receipt doctrine by the courts?
The ability of the federal courts to "reorder" a series of legally
independent transactions when a taxpayer has exercised his power to
manipulate those transactions and thus achieve a desired tax result
is founded in the Supreme Court decision Commissioner v. Court
Holding Co.10 In Court Holding Co. the Supreme Court was asked to
Behrend, Humacid cannot stand for the proposition that the mere absence of a "bind-
ing obligation" demands rejection of step transaction analysis.
The court in Sheppard felt that the donor's inability to force the sale of the
donated property back to the corporation was a vital consideration in fully disposing
of the control issue. 361 F.2d at 978. Proper analysis of the court's rationale in
Sheppard indicates that, if the courts in either Behrend, Carrington, or Grove felt that
absence of a "binding obligation" alone was sufficient to deny the IRS request for
reconstruction of the transactions, such a position was unjustified.
-324 U.S. 331 (1945). Although Court Holding Co. is primarily associated with the
enactment of § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 (the corporate liquidation
provision) it has remained the general authority for "reordering" transactions absent
1974]
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consider the tax liability of a corporation that, in anticipation of a
large capital gains tax, made a liquidating distribution of an apart-
ment building to its shareholders in order that they, instead of the
corporation, might sell the property and realize the gain. There was
no evidence that the shareholders were under any legal obligation to
sell the property, yet the Court upheld a finding by the Tax Court6 '
that the transactions should be reconstructed to reflect that in sub-
stantive reality the corporation made the sale and subsequently dis-
tributed the proceeds to the shareholders. A sale contract executed
by all of the shareholders, who possessed among themselves the power
to force its adoption by the corporation, was in essence the contract
of the corporation.12 Although the taxpayer had the right to reduce
its tax liability, the Court imposed the restriction that in doing so the
corporation had to utilize procedures which Congress intended to
permit."' Thus Court Holding Co., albeit concerned with a corporate
taxpayer, made it clear that when a taxpayer exercises his power to
manipulate a number of taxable events and achieves a tax result that
contravenes the purpose of the tax laws, the federal courts are war-
ranted in "reordering" the transactions even in the absence of legal
obligation. "
Rosenberg v. Commissioner1 illustrates the relevance of Court
Holding Co. where close corporation shareholders, without the use of
contractual obligations, devised a plan to withdraw corporate earn-
ings at a reduced tax rate by manipulation of the corporate redemp-
tion mechanism." In Rosenberg, a close corporation used a tax-free
contractual obligation when the circumstances demand it. See text accompanying
notes 61-69 infra.
12 T.C. 531 (1943).
'1"d. at 539, citing Duggan v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 608, 629 (1929).
612 T.C. at 541. The Supreme Court, in upholding the Tax Court, appeared to
reaffirm its earlier position on application of the step transaction doctrine expressed
in Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935):
The legal right of a taxpayer to decrease the amount of what otherwise
would be his taxes, or altogether avoid them, by means which the law
permits, cannot be doubted .... [Tjhe question for determination is
whether what was done, apart from tax motive, was the thing which
the statute intended.
"For a detailed analysis by the Supreme Court of what it meant when it decided
Court Holding Co., see United States v. Cumberland Public Services Co., 338 U.S. 451,
453-56 (1950).
"'36 T.C. 716 (1961).
"In addition to Rosenberg, see Malkan v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1305 (1970) for
use of Court Holding Co. in taxing preferred stock "bail-outs." The term "bail-out"
has been used by the courts to refer to a controlling shareholder's withdrawal of corpo-
rate earnings for his own use at reduced tax rates (i.e. the capital gains rate) through
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recapitalization to authorize and issue to its two shareholders com-
mon stock and two classes of preferred-Class "A" of which the cor-
poration was obligated to redeem seven percent per year, and Class
"B" which was convertible into Class "A" preferred. The sharehold-
ers sold their Class "B" preferred to an institutional investor who
immediately converted the purchased stock into Class "A" stock,
thereby subjecting it to the mandatory redemption provision. The
shareholders claimed capital gains treatment on the sale of the pre-
ferred stock. However, the court held that through application of
Court Holding Co.,67 in substantive reality the corporation, not the
shareholders, sold the preferred stock to the institutional investor and
subsequently distributed the sales proceeds as income to the share-
holders. There was no doubt that the preferred shares had been "de-
signed to accomplish [a] preconceived plan,""8 and that the purpose
of the plan had been to "siphon off the corporate earnings and profits
. . . without a permanent impairment of [the shareholders'] owner-
ship and control of the corporation." 69 Therefore, the shareholders
were held in constructive receipt of dividend income, despite the fact
that there had been no contractual obligation on the part of the
purchaser of the Class "B" preferred to exercise his conversion option
and make redemption mandatory.
The use of the substantive reality inquiry of Court Holding Co.
to "reorder" the events in Rosenberg implies that both Behrend and
Grove,7 0 in refusing to make the same inquiry, cannot be viewed as
the sale of preferred stock which the corporation thereafter redeems. But see Chamber-
lin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462, 471 (6th Cir. 1953), where the court refused to hold
the taxpayer in constructive receipt because the redemption features of the preferred
stock sold were "reasonable" and "not violative of bona fide corporate financing."
036 T.C. at 725 where the court quoted the following language of Court Holding
Co.:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transac-
tion. The tax consequences which arise from gains from sale of prop-
erty are not finally to be determined solely by the means employed to
transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction must be viewed as a whole,
and each step,' from the commencement of negotiations to the con-
summation of the sale, is relevant. A sale by one person cannot be
transformed for tax purposes into a sale by another by using the latter
as a conduit through which to pass title. To permit the true nature of
a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely
to alter tax liabilities, would seriously impair the effective administra-
tion of the tax policies of Congress.
324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).
'136 T.C. at 725.
"Id. at 726.
7'In Carrington the facts do not appear to provide a basis for proper application
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fully dispositive of the donation-redemption transactions they con-
sidered. Where there is evidence that a plan of tax avoidance has
been adopted and the taxpayer has the power to effect that plan,
Court Holding Co. would appear to demand that the court must
consider whether the intended tax effect is one that is consistent with
the intent of Congress as embodied in the tax laws.
In Behrend, neither the Fourth Circuit nor the parties to the liti-
gation ever denied the existence of a preconceived donation-
redemption scheme to reduce tax liability.71 There was little question
that the brothers, in retaining the full voting control of their corpora-
tion, had the power to force the redemption of the stock .7 Yet there
is no language in the opinion that might indicate any consideration
of Court Holding Co., since the donor completely divested himself of the ability to
control his corporation. See text accompanying notes 38-43 supra. Where the stock-
holder either lacks the ability to control the corporate redemption mechanism prior to
the donation, or divests himself of that control via the stock transfer, the law relating
to gifts of appreciated property, as stated in Humacid and Sheppard, should properly
govern. This is essentially identical to the position taken by the courts recently with
regard to the donation of stock prior to a complete liquidation. See Hudspeth v. United
States, 471 F.2d 275 (8th Cir. 1972); accord, Kinsey v. Commissioner, 477 F.2d 1058
(2d Cir. 1973). If a liquidation has been voted by the shareholders and a controlling
shareholder donates stock to a tax-exempt organization prior to the record date, the
donor is held to have assigned a present right to a future liquidating "dividend," unless
the stock donated is sufficient to give the donee the control necessary to stop the
liquidation if it so desires. The taxation of the donor is founded in the assignment of
income doctrine of Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
The reliance on legal voting control as determinative of the taxation issue in the
case of the liquidating distribution cases, however, may be more justified than in
Carrington. Although the church in Carrington held fifty-one percent of the voting
control of the corporation and could have rescinded a prior resolution of the sharehold-
ers to liquidate, such control may not have provided the donee the ability to control
the Board of Directors, wherein the authority to redeem the stock of a corporation is
normally vested.
7173-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 80,066.
,T he Fourth Circuit considered the following language of National Carbide Corp.
v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422, 429 (1949) dispositive of the control issue:
[A] corporation formed or operated for business purposes must share
the tax burden despite substantial identity, in practical operation,
with its owner. Complete ownership of the corporation, and the con-
trol primarily dependent upon such ownership . . . are no longer of
significance in determining taxability.
This case does not appear to be relevant to the real control issue presented since the
Fourth Circuit was not asked to determine the taxability of the corporation or the
foundation as a separate tax entity. Rather, the issue was whether the Behrends'
ability to control the redemption of the donated stock raised the relevance of Court
Holding Co. and Rosenberg in determining the taxability of the donation-redemption
scheme facing the court.
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of the Court Holding Co. test. It is possible that the court considered
Court Holding Co. and the Rosenberg case inapposite because of the
greater length of time that separated the series of donations from the
redemptions in Behrend. However, such a conclusion would have
been tenuous, for where the taxpayer has freely admitted the exist-
ence of the plan and the delay is adequately explained, courts have
frequently disregarded the time factor.
73
The Second Circuit in Grove, as a result of its strong reliance on
Behrend, also failed to consider the Court Holding Co. test for "reor-
dering" transactions. In Grove there was no admission of a planned
scheme of tax avoidance, yet full consideration of all the facts pre-
sented to the court could hardly, it seems, have avoided that conclu-
sion. The donor was well aware that the recipient of his gift would
desire its cash conversion 7 and accordingly provided by contract that
the educational institution allow the corporation to redeem the stock
before it was offered for sale to an outsider. The thirteen year system-
atic donation of stock, followed by its redemption within two years
of receipt, presented a sound factual basis for finding that a scheme
existed, despite the nonexistence of a formal agreement binding
the parties to perform. The lengthy consistency of the pattern, to-
gether with the control that the donor retained over the donations75
and redemptions, would appear to have demanded closer scrutiny of
the tax consequences of the transactions and a reasoned judgment
whether such a series of transactions, planned and controlled by the
taxpayer, were consistent with the intent of Congress.
Both Behrend and Grove thus presented facts to their respective
courts which should have raised the Court Holding Co. line of inquiry
for full consideration. The presence of the tax-reduction scheme and
the existence of the manipulative power of the donor in each case to
"nIn Behrend the taxpayers stated that the sole reason for the delay in redeeming
the stock was in order to allow the corporation to reach a net worth of $750,000. 73-1
U.S. Tax Cas. at 80,066. Since time is merely one item of objective evidence the courts
consider when applying step transaction analysis, the greater the evidence that a plan
exists, the less need there is to rely on the time element. See Moffat v. Commissioner,
363 F.2d 262 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1016 (1967); Fry v. Commissioner,
5 T.C. 1058 (1945); Douglas v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 1122 (1938).
"See 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,914 (dissenting opinion). Since Grove's corporation
was a construction company and any investment therein was very risky, it was inevita-
ble that the institution would want to convert the donated stock into cash for reinvest-
ment in more profitable and safer securities.
7 The donor retained control over the donated stock by contracting with the tax-
exempt institution that his personal investment advisor should retain the right to
control any investment of the proceeds from the stock's cash conversion. See 73-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. at 81,910.
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perpetrate his scheme were signals that should have alerted the court
to a possible basis, absent evidence of a "binding obligation," for
constructive dividend treatment. However, until the preconceived
plans initiated by the donors are examined against the background
of congressional intent, it cannot be determined whether the Fourth
or the Second Circuit wrongfully refused to "reorder" the donation-
redemption schemes.
The initial point for analysis in determining if the donation-
redemption schemes utilized in Behrend and Grove violated congres-
sional intent must be the legislative purpose for the favorable tax
treatment afforded a gift of appreciated property. It is well recognized
that Congress, in an effort to encourage contributions to charitable
organizations, permits a donor to deduct the full value of any gift of
appreciated property without reporting the appreciation in the value
of the property as income from the exchange .7 In light of this clear
congressional purpose it is important to consider the motive behind
the taxpayer's decision to make the charitable gift. It is at this point
that a second major basis for constructive dividend treatment-
namely, evidence of direct economic benefits accruing to the tax-
payer through a corporate distribution-becomes relevant.
7
Where the taxpayer initiates a plan of charitable donations by
which he obtains direct economic benefits in addition to the tax
savings which Congress intended, it would appear that these benefits
in fact become a principle motivation for the donation.78 Once it
becomes clear that the taxpayer has utilized a particular set of trans-
6Sheppard v. United States, 361 F.2d 972, 978-79 (Ct. Cl. 1966). See notes 1-7
supra and accompanying text.
"The courts have traditionally had little trouble "reordering" transactions when
it is clear that the taxpayer has utilized a particular group of events to avoid the
taxation of an economic benefit accruing directly to him. The underlying principle was
developed in the landmark decision of Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S.
716, 729 (1929), where the Supreme Court held that an employee was in constructive
receipt of income when his economic obligations were discharged by his employer.
,Congress in 1969 recognized that in the area of charitable deductions for dona-
tions of appreciated property the tax benefits accruing to the taxpayer were so great
as to demand a reform of the tax laws. See generally H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Congress,
1st Sess. (1969). As a result, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 provided that when a taxpayer
donates appreciated property, which if sold would have been taxed at ordinary income
rates, the charitable deduction is limited to the taxpayer's adjusted basis in the
property. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 170(e)(1)(A). Since a gain upon disposition of
§ 306 stock, such as the Behrends would have obtained if their reorganization had been
post-1954, results in ordinary income to the shareholder, it is clear that the donation-
redemption scheme of Behrend has lost a certain amount of its attractiveness for future
taxpayers. They will now obtain a deduction only to the extent of their adjusted basis
in that stock.
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actions to achieve a particular tax result, yet has done so for a pur-
pose that Congress never intended to permit, courts have tradition-
ally reconstructed the transactions to reflect the substantive reality
of the events. 79 Therefore, a determination by the courts in Behrend
and Grove"' that the donors received from their donation-redemption
schemes direct economic benefits would probably have been suffi-
cient grounds for a conclusion that the donors constructively received
dividend income. However, the personal economic benefits derived
by the respective donors were not scrutinized by either the Fourth or
Second Circuits, although there appeared to be sufficient evidence to
warrant a finding of constructive dividend income.
In Behrend there was no dispute that the money received by the
foundation upon the redemption of the donated preferred stock was
used in part to satisfy loans on which the donors were personally,
although apparently only secondarily,' liable. The Behrends had
originally intended that, although the stock would be redeemed in
order to pay the notes, the redemption would not occur until the
corporation's net worth reached $750,000. In fact, when the stock was
redeemed stockholder's equity was merely $340,000.8 A reasonable
inference appears to be that the donors abandoned their original plan
and caused the stock to be redeemed because the notes were due and
they wished to extinguish their personal liability, fearing the inability
of the foundation to meet its primary obligation.
The Fourth Circuit in Behrend disregarded the fact that the tax-
payers may have derived a direct economic benefit upon redemption
of the stock. This apparent oversight by the court is particularly
troublesome in light of the numerous cases which have held that
when a taxpayer's debt to a third party is extinguished through a
corporate distribution of earnings and profits the taxpayer construc-
tively receives income." A proper disposition of the facts as presented
'The language of the court in Rosenberg is typical of the federal courts' position
in this area of tax litigation. See notes 65-69 supra and accompanying text.
"Besides the charitable deduction no personal economic benefits accrued to the
donor in Carrington v. Commissioner, 476 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1973). See text accompa-
nying notes 38-43 supra.
"'The Behrends' liability as endorsers of the bank loans meant that their liability
was a secondary one. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 95B, § 3-414 (Repl. vol. 1964).
2Brief for Appellee at 5, Behrend v. United States, 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 80,065 (4th
Cir. 1972).
x3E.g., Commissioner v. Makransky, 321 F.2d 598, 601 (3d Cir. 1963), relying on
Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); Wall
v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947). See also Cox v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.
1270 (1971); Phelon v. Commissioner, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1024 (1966). Although
the satisfaction of a secondary liability is not as direct an economic benefit as that
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in Behrend would appear to have demanded at least a brief discus-
sion, if not a full consideration, of this established precedent before
the court declined to apply the constructive receipt doctrine.
Specifically, the Fourth Circuit should have considered the Tax
Court memorandum decision of Phelon v. Commissioner." In the
absence of evidence establishing any "binding obligation," the court
in Phelon reconstructed the donation-redemption scheme of the tax-
payer and held him to be in constructive receipt of income when,
subsequent to his donation of stock to his private foundation, the
stock was redeemed from the foundation and the proceeds were do-
nated by the foundation to a museum where they were applied
against his personal debt. The liability, which he had incurred in the
service of the museum, was partially a liability as guarantor on a
personal note, while the remaining portion was an outright contrac-
tual obligation to pay a third party. The Tax Court found the donor
to be in constructive receipt of income where the foundation never
retained the redemption proceeds, nor was intended to retain them.58
Relying on Rosenberg, the court held that the manipulation of the
redemption mechanism by the taxpayer for his own personal benefit
demanded that he be taxed on the full redemption proceeds.
In light of applicable decisions like Phelon"6 and the substantive
reality inquiry of Rosenberg,the Fourth Circuit should have devoted
its energy to a fuller consideration of the events that transpired after
the irrevocable transfer of the stock by the Behrends to their private
foundation.8 7 The subsequent use by the taxpayers of the redemption
mechanism they controlled, to extinguish a liability they very possi-
bly anticipated88 was due, seems to provide a sound factual basis for
constructive dividend treatment. Clearly, Congress never intended
derived when a primary indebtedness is extinguished, the law is clear that where there
is evidence that the taxpayer's secondary liability is almost certain to become primary
the court considers the benefit substantial. Cox. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1270, 1280
(1971). See also United States v. Smith, 418 F.2d 589, 594-95 (5th Cir. 1969).
1125 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1024 (1966).
'Id. at 1028.
"See note 83 supra.
',The Fourth Circuit did mention that a "predominant force" in its decision not
to hold the taxpayer in constructive receipt was the "fact that the taxpayers did not
participate whatsoever in the beneficience of the foundation." 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at
80,067. It would appear that the court with this statement was referring to the absence
of evidence that the taxpayers were improperly withdr.qwing funds from the founda-
tion. Absence of evidence that the taxpayers were manipulating the foundation, how-
ever, should not prevent a finding by the appellate court that the specific distribution
in redemption of stock produced an economic benefit to the taxpayers.
"'See text accompanying note 82 supra.
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that its tax inducements for charitable gifts of appreciated property
should allow a taxpayer the tax-free use of income for his own benefit.
It is possible that the Fourth Circuit considered that the delayed
redemption by the Behrends made their case distinguishable from
decisions such as Phelon and Rosenberg, where the redemptions oc-
curred immediately. However, the time element should have been
readily discarded by the court where the plan had been unequivocally
adopted, and the delay adequately explained by the facts. 9
The opinion of the Second Circuit in Grove is also unsatisfactory
because of its failure to analyze the underlying effect of the redemp-
tions against a background of the economic benefit obtained by the
donor. As Judge Oakes emphasized in his dissent, through a pattern
of donation and systematic redemption over a period of thirteen
years, the taxpayer converted the donated stock into "safe income
bearing securities" 0 over which his personal investment advisor re-
tained full supervision. In effect, the redemption mechanism was
utilized to convert the donated stock into a "low risk pension fund"',
for the donor and his wife.
The facts of Grove appear to have required full consideration by
the Second Circuit of the well-established case law that corporate
distributions for the benefit of the controlling shareholder often result
in the constructive receipt of income by this shareholder.2 In Security
First National Bank v. Commissioner3 a corporate transfer of land
to a charitable trust created by the taxpayer to display art and litera-
ture was deemed a distribution to the taxpayer, as controlling share-
holder, with his subsequent transfer of the land to the trust. The
corporation had acted solely to accommodate the taxpayer in provid-
ing the trust with the ability to purchase more art work. The court's
description of the substantive reality of the transaction seems partic-
ularly relevant to Grove:
At the end of the day the earned surplus of the corporation was
reduced . . . the trust had the art objects, and the [taxpayer]
"See note 73 supra.
1173-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,914 (dissenting opinion).
"Id. at 81,915.
'Commissioner v. Makransky, 321 F.2d 598, 602 (3d Cir. 1963), relying on Byers
v. Commissioner, 199 F.2d 273 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 907 (1953); Lasker
v. Commissioner, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 50 (1972). See also Clark v. Commissioner,
84 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1936), and Security First National Bank v. Commissioner, 28
B.T.A. 289 (1933), as basis for Rev. Rul. 658, 1968-2 CUM. BuLL. 119; accord, Edgar v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 717, 758 (1971).
=28 B.T.A. 289 (1933).
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had fully accomplished his sole purpose in having the transfers
made."
In Grove the donation of the stock to the educational institution
provided, in addition to charitable deductions for thirteen years, the
means by which the donor converted corporate earnings into the
equivalent of a high yield pension trust fund in which the donee held
merely a residual interest in the corpus of the trust. Where the donor
derived such an obvious direct economic benefit far in excess of the
deduction provided by Congress, it seems difficult to explain the
statement by the Second Circuit that, "in the absence of any support-
ing facts,"' 5 holding the taxpayer in constructive receipt of the in-
come distributed by his corporation would have been "arbitrary, ca-
pricious, and ultimately destructive of traditional notions of judicial
review.""
While the Fifth Circuit in Carrington properly refused the IRS
request for "reordering" the donation-redemption scheme where the
donor enjoyed no personal economic benefit except the charitable
deduction,17 both Behrend and Grove, in light of the corporate distri-
butions for the benefit of the taxpayers, are subject to serious ques-
tion. If the circuit courts had considered all the facts and scrutinized
these additional direct economic benefits derived by the donors in the
spirit of the Court Holding Co. test, they might have concluded that
the substantive realities demanded application of constructive divi-
dend treatment. In the final analysis, these additional direct eco-
nomic benefits accruing to donors through the corporate redemptions
should provide a basis for constructive dividend treatment, even in
the absence of "binding obligation."
More important than the possible impropriety of the specific re-
sults reached by the Fourth Circuit in Behrend and the Second Cir-
cuit in Grove is their severe restriction of the traditional criteria
utilized by federal courts when asked to apply the step transaction
doctrine. The Fourth Circuit's refusal in the absence of "binding
obligation" to make the substantive reality inquiry of Court Holding
Co. represents a crucial departure from established legal precedent,
for it has traditionally been in the absence of "binding obligation"
that this inquiry has become not only relevant, but absolutely vital.
The Behrend departure seems unjustified, and, as the Grove decision
:Id. at 311.
5 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. at 81,913.
DAId.
17See note 80 supra.
